,IL HE prospect of federal government deficits totaling $907 billion between 1985 and 1990 has renewed doubts about the Feder'al Reserve's ability to conduct independent monetary policy. Often implicitly underlying these doubts is the fear that increases in federal debt will drive up interest rates and slow economic growth in the absence of expansionary monetary policy. Given the magnitude of projected federal deficits, many analysts are concerned that the Federal Reserve may feel obliged to increase the money stock faster than it otherwise would to keep interest rates from rising.'
It is the purpose of this paper to offer some evidence on the extent to which the Federal Reserve has altered monetary policy in response to federal deficits.' The focus here is to determine if monetary policy has reacted to federal deficits in a consistent manner over time. The sensitivity of monetary actions to debt growth is considered over different time periods and Richard 0. Sheehan is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Larry J OiMariano provided research assistance. 'Sargent and Wallace (1981) have gone so far as to argue that the Federal Reserve has only a choice between increasing the money stock sooner or later. While Darby (1984) has disputed this contention, the issue apparently remains unresolved. See Miller and Sargent (1984) . ' The process of a debt increase directly leading to expansionary monetary policy is often labeled "monetizing the debt." Given the ambiguities surrounding that phrase, it is not used here. See Thornton (1984) for a detailed explanation of alternate definitions of the phrase. The textbook view of the relationship between monetary policy and federal debt can be demonstrated in the context of a simple comparative static money market model, which is summarized in figure 1. Let us assume that money demand fMDI is a function of the interest rate and the level of income and that the Federal Reserve can effectively fix the money supply IMSI. With some initial level of income, money demand and supply functions may be represented by MD,, and MS,,, respectively. Given a structural (or exogenous or active) change in fiscal policy, say, an expansionary action increasing the deficit. income will rise in the short run.' This increase in income, in turn, will lead to an increase in money demand, shifting the money demand curve from MD,, to MD, in figure I Comparative Static Money Market Model deficit will not alter the money stock the interest rate from r,, to r,.'
With cyclical (or endogenous or passive) fiscal policy changes, however, the impact of changes in the structural deficit is quite different. Assume the economy enters a recession as a result of a non-policy shock to the system. The automatic stabilizing properties of federal taxes and expenditures will lead to a cyclical increase in the deficit as income declines. Furthel-, the decline in income will reduce the demand for money, shifting the money demand schedule, say, from MD, to MD,, in figure 1. Again, if the Federal Reserve is using a monetary aggregate as its target, the money stock will remain constant. An increase in the cyclical deficit will now be accompanied, however, by a reduction in the interest rate from r, to r,,. With a monetary aggregate target, this model implies that structural deficits will lead to increases in the interest rate. while cyclical deficits will be accompanied by decreases in the interest rate.
In contrast, if the Federal Reserve is using the fed-'This discussion assumes loanable funds demand is not completely elastic. It further assumes the Federal Reserve is focusing on a monetary aggregate and will not change its desired value of that aggregate in the face of temporary fluctuations in income.
but will increase eral funds rate as its target, the increase in the structural deficit and the resulting increase in money demand will prompt it to r-espond differently. The increase in interest rates as money demand increases from MD,, to MD, would lead the Federal Reserve to increase the money supply ffrom MS, to MS,l sufficiently to drive interest rates in general and the feder'al funds rate in particular back to their original levels.' With an interest rate target, the exogenous deficit increase would not influence the interest rate but would increase the money stock.
If the Federal Reserve has not followed a pure interest rate or monetary aggregate target but instead has followed a mixed strategy using both, a structural deficit would still shift the money demand curve out as before, but the money supply curve would shift out only partially, say, from MS, to MS,." Thus, the struc-MD 1 tural debt increase would lead to both higher interest rates and higher money growth.
With a federal funds target and an increase in the
cyclical deficit leading to a decrease in money demand from MD, to MD,,, the Federal Reserve would decrease the money stock from MS, to MS,, to keep the interest rate unchanged-with a mixed targeting strategy and an increase in the cyclical deficit, the money supply would be expected to shift partially downward from MS to MS,. Thus, the increased deficit would be accompanied by a lower interest rate and a lower money supply.
Whether an increase in the deficit is accompanied by incr'eases or decreases in the money stock and interest rates depends on the source of the deficit and on the manner' in which the Federal Reserve is conducting policy. The alter'natives are summarized in tablet.
It should be noted that a given deficit may combine structural and cyclical elements. In that case, the impact of the deficit on the interest rate is ambiguous if the Federal Reserve targets on a monetary aggregate; its impact on the money supply is ambiguous if the Fed targets on interest rates. Both impacts would be ambiguous with a mixed targeting procedure. Further, ther'e is no guarantee that the Federal Reserve has followed (or will follow) a consistent pattern of target-'It the Federal Reserve is operating with an interest rate target, it is also necessary to assume that the Federal Reserve believes that money changes can alter interest rates -as they do in this simple model -and that the Fed has a willingness to alter the money stock based on that belief.°L ombraand Moran (1980) (4) from October 1982 to the present, again a mixed targeting strategy. While it would prove fruitful to examine "reaction functions" estimated separately over each of these periods, the short time frames of the latter two periods preclude that option. Thus, the sample is divided into two subperiods, the flrst prior to 1971 characterized by interest rate targeting and the second from 1971 with a greater focus on monetary aggregates. rni~r'~i'srsr~j !IJN.C11c.N~'
There have been a number of previous studies that have examined the relationship between monetary 'See Lombra and Moran (1980) and Wallich and Keir (1979) . 'See Thornton (1983) and the sources cited there. policy and federal deficits. Most of these studies fall under the general heading of estimating a 'reaction function" for the Federal Reserve? The reaction function approach assumes that the Federal Reserve's policy actions are based on its goals, its model of the economy and the constraints that the model implies. Thus, the estimated reaction function is based implicitly -or explicitly in the case of McMillin and Beard (1980) -on output and financial market models, together with a rule (that is, an assumption about how the Fed will react to disturbances to reach its goals) for determining Federal Reserve behavior. CQmbining the behavioral assumptions of the policy rule with the output and financial market models predicts how the Federal Reserve will react to disturbances to the economic system -hence, a "reaction function."
Previously estimated reaction functions have differed with respect to the choice of dependent and independent variables, the functional form employed, the time period used for estimation and the conclusions based on that estimation. They also have reached different conclusions about the stability of the estimated reaction function. Thus, it is useful to briefly survey previously estimated reaction functions.
Three variables commonly have been employed as the dependent variable, that is, as the measure ofmonetary policy. Niskanen (1978) and Barro (1977) among others use a measure of the money stock, Ml, assuming that the money stock is the best indicator of monetary policy during the period of estimation. Froyen (1974) , Levy (1981) , and Barth, Sickles, and Wiest (1982) use the monetary base instead, contending that the base corresponds more closely to open market operations and is a good measure of exogenous monetary policy actions. The third alternative, used by Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1980) , DeRosa and Stern (1977), and Flavrilesky, Sapp, and Schweitzer (1975) , is the federal funds rate. They argue that this variable is a more appropriate measure of monetary policy in periods in which the Federal Reserve is targeting on interest rates. They further contend that the Federal Reserve, in fact, has targeted interest rates during most of the post-World War II period.
Previously estimated reaction function estimates also have used a wide range of independent variables and have assumed alternate goals of the Federal Re-'For example, see Allen and Smith (1983) , Barth, Sickles, and Wiest (1982) , Froyen (1974) , Hamburger and Zwick (1981, 1982) , Levy (1981) , McMiilin and Beard (1980, 1982) . Two studies that do not use the reaction function approach are Dwyer (1982) and Thornton (1984) . For a detailed statement of the deficit problem, see Tatom (1984) .
serve (e.g., pr-ice stability, low unemployment, high real gr-owth rates and financial mar-ket stability). Most previous studies have used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation techniques, and independent variables generally are included with no mor'e than one lag."
The estimation r-esults have been inconsistent in a number of respects. For example, using the monetary base as the policy measure, Allen and Smith 1983) found that the unemployment rate was significant, while Levy (19811 found it insignificant. On the impact of the debt, included as a measure of financial market stability, Levy concluded that debt growth influenced monetary policy, while Hambur-ger and Zwick (1981) r'eached exactly the opposite conclusion. On the stability of the estimated reaction function, Allen and Smith (1983) argued in favor of a stable relationship; Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1980) reported findings of instability. It is unclear to what extent these differences are due to different sample periods, the choice of independent variables, the specification ofthe monetary policy variable or the use of different functional forms."
The basic reaction function approach is also employed here. Two alternative monetary policy measures are used as dependent variables: the money stock (Ml) and the federal funds rate (i~~), given that the Feder'al Reserve has alternately focused on interest rates and the money stock." To further allow comparison of the estimation results with the potential relationships between monetary policy and deficits as presented in table 1, we employ two measures of debt growth in the following empirical analysis: the net federal debt )NFD) and the high employment deficit IHEBDL" " Levy (1981) used instrumental variables and Abrams, Froyen, and Waud (1980) used 3SLS. Froyen (1974) and studies using Barro's (1977) basic specification used more than one lag. "See Barlh, Sickles, and Wiest (1982) or McMillin and Beard (1981) for a more extensive review of the reaction function literature. Thornton (1984) uses a different framework focusing on the "causal" relationships between monetary policy and debt rather than using a reaction function approach. His results are consistent with the findings of the reaction function literature. There apparently exists a relationship between monetary policy and federal debt, but this finding is sensitive to the period of analysis chosen as well as the precise measure used for debt.
"The monetary base is not used as a measure of monetary policy since Thornton (1984) has shown the linkage between debt growth and the monetary base is influenced by a number of other factors. "Previous reaction functions have generally used either NFD or HEBD although Froyen (1974) used both in the same equation.
Neither of these two measur-es is a perfect indicator' of the pressure on the Federal Reserve to alter policy in response to changes in federal debt. NFl) is potentially influenced by macroeconomic shocks, which may also have an impact on (or-be the result of) monetary policy. Thus, NFD includes both str'uctural and cyclical components. NFL) does have the advantage of including off-budget items, and the recent gr-owth in off-budget items may represent substantial additional pressure on monetary policvmakers." The HEBD measure is adjusted for real income changes."Thus, it may be considered a measure of structural policy changes. HERD, however, does not include off-budget items. "See deLeeu'w and Holloway (1982) .
"Froyen has noted that the estimated reaction function actually represents a loint test of the influence of the chosen stabilization goals and constraints together with the appropriateness of the chosen dependent variable. Lags of the dependent and independent variables are included (1) to allow gradual adiustment to goals so that monetary policy is not a source of instability and (2) to capture the effect on monetary policy of variables omitted from the model.
literature, interest rate terms are included in the money equation, while money terms are included in the interest rate equation.
All variables were included in log difference form except for HEBU, which is included in level form. Maximum lag lengths were arbitrarily restricted to 12 lags on the dependent variables and six lags for the other right-hand-side variables. The choice of appropriate lag length was then determined by Aldake's final prediction error (FPE) criterion." flben the FPE search for the preferred lag specification indicated that no values of a right-hand-side variable improved the specification, that variable was dropped from the basic equation. Except when noted, a variable was included in the estimated equation only when an F-test oh its joint coefficients indicated it was significant at the 10 percent level. Two-stage least squares was used as the estimation technique to avoid problems of simultaneity."
ESTIMNI71O.tSJ RESULTS
The reaction function results estimated over the 1958-84 period are presented in tables 2 and 3. Tables  4 and 5 Table 2 presents the equations estimated initially with NFD as an independent variable. The top part of the table presents the coefficient sums and the tstatistics on whether that sum is significantly different from zero. At the bottom of table 2, the significance "See Batten and Thornton (1984) . In one instance below, the FPE chose the maximum lag length allowed. In that case, the maximum lag length was increased but further lags were insignificant. "Only one equation is estimated, and this periods inflation, unemployment rate, etc., may be influenced by this period's monetary policy. In the first stage, each of the dependent variables was regressed on 10 lags of itself and four lags of all other variables in the model. The maximum lag lengths were arbitrarily restricted. The second stage, reported in the text, replaces the current values of the independent variables with the first stage estimates. If HEBD were an exogenous policy tool, the use of an instrument for HEBD would be unnecessary. There is no reason, however, to assume that current fiscal policy is independent of, say, current monetary policy actions. (1)
Full Pericnl Resulls
The 0-statistic tests for autocorrelation in the presence ol lagged dependent variab!es It follows a chi-square distribution and is caiculated lot 20 degrees of freedom. The critical value at the 95 percent evel is 31 .41 i3iven the varyng degrees of freedom, the signilicance levels of the joint F-statistics are presented The number of lags are included in parentheses.
'aloes WI' 1 ,i't'stnli'tl mi' 11W ni it hypothesis that all the roettici'nt', for a par u'nlai'~ariahIe alt' equal It) Zero. t'ht'se signiliranre lt'~t'IsZirc' pri~ented 'inre the lag Ieriglhs anti corresponding cit-gi'ets ()I tn'tcil)nt \an' h-nm ont' spt'ntiration IC) another 1 lie lag Itngths an' inelLided in pan'ntheses fern indicates Ihat unIv I he t rintemporarienus '~ariahle is included Since net It-decal delit. on avei-age had rio~igniIic-ant iillFXtC't till 0100ev tliirtii,t~the 111Th 84 period it was triiiitti'cl ti't,rit tIn' \l I ttItlZititlli \J' I) i~iiitltitlttl iii tt~i' FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUtS MARCH 1985 federal funds rate equation since the sum of its coefficients is significant at the 10 percent level. A 1 percent increase in NFD lowers the federal funds rate by an estimated 2.56 percent. Since NED contains both structural and cyclical components, based on table 1, it appear's that the cyclical component of NED dominates the structural component in the federal funds rate equation. Further. since NED significantly enters the federal funds rate equation, the Federal Reserve apparently did not follow a pure interest rate strategy over the 1958-84 period. This result is consistent with the hypothesized mixed targeting procedure."
The HERD results presented in table 3 apparently yield conclusions at odds with these results. With the HERD measure, the deficit has a significant positive impact on the money stock but no impact on the federal funds i-ate; consequently, it was omitted from the final estimated federal funds equation. Given HERD as a measure of the structural deficit, the impact of HERD on Ml and~is consistent with the Federal Reserve, on average, pursuing an interest rate targeting strategy during the 1958-84 period.
The conditions presented in table 1, however, represent only sufficient conditions for the structural deficit to have no impact on the federal funds rate. tn otherwords, it is not necessarvforthe Federal Reserve to be targeting interest rates in ordei-to generate the result that HERD does not influence i,,,. For example, if HERD is small relative to the loanable funds market or if the supply of loanable funds is interest-elastic, then HERD would have little influence on~FF even with, say, a mixed targeting strategy.
Further, there is evidence to suggest that the structural deficit represents a relatively small fraction of the total demand for loanable funds. For example, in 1982, HERD averaged $32.8 billion while net credit market borrowing by nonfinancial sectors was $404.1 billion. Thus, the HERD component of federal borrowing was only 8.1 percent of funds borrowed. In contrast, on average from 1975 to 1981, similar figures indicate HERD was only 4.6 percent of net funds borrowed. HERD may have little or no impact on interest rates not because of the particular targeting procedure used by the Federal Reserve, but rather because of the small relative size of the structural deficit. Given this interpretation, the results in table 3 are also consistent with a mixed targeting strategy.
"The coefficients on the non-debt terms in table 2 deserve comment.
Inflation does not significantly enter the Ml equation and unemployment enters with a negative coefficient. Whilethe negative coefficient on the unemployment rate is significant in all equations, its economic impact is minor. For example, a reduction in the unemployment rate from 7.5 percent to 7.0 percent would increase the growth rate of money by only 0.2 percent. The procyclical response of monetary policy to the unemployment rate is certainly not intuitive; it is, however, consistent with the findings of Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1980) .
Although the sum of the coefficients on the inflation term in the federal funds rate equation is not significant, the joint impact is significant. The short-run impacts are large in magnitude although approximately offsetting over a year. Similarly, the sum of the coefficients on money growth in the federal funds rate equation are not significantly different from zero. Again, it is the result of offsetting individual coefficients. consistent with the Federal Reserve following a monetaiy aggregate target.
The federal funds rate equations estimated over the later period were similar to those for the early and the full periods. In contrast, the money stock equations were substantially different in the later period. The money stock equations chosen by Akiake's FPE and Ftests consistently imply that virtually all variables entered, with the possible exception of the federal funds rate and the inflation i-ate, are insignificant.
From the perspective of estimating a reaction function that explains" much of the variation in the money stock, the 1971-84 results leave much to be desired. They are, however, consistent with two very different theories of Federal Reserve behavior. First, it is possible that over this period the goals of the Federal Reserve or the weights on those goals were changing frequently, perhaps due to shifts in money demand, deregulation or financial innovations. tf true, it would be impossible to estimate a consistent relationship between goals and the money stock. In the extreme, the money stock after detrending would be a random walk. Alternately, the Federal Reserve, on average, may have followed a constant money growth r-ate rule. In this case, the money stock after detrending would also be a random walk. Either of these hypotheses would be consistent with a poorly performing short-run reaction function for the money stock.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
'rhis paper has examined whether federal debt growth has influenced alternate measures of monetars' policy. It was demonstrated that a structural deficit would have very different implications than a cyclical deficit. A structural deficit in the static model presented here could lead to an increase in money growth andlor interest rates. tn contrast, a cyclical deficit could be accompanied by a decrease in money growth and/or interest rates. Whether debt alters money growth or interest rates depends on the nature of the targeting strategy used by the Federal Reserve.
The results of a reaction function, developed and estimated over-alter-nate intervals, suggest that prior-to 1971 debt growth did lead to money growth but did not influence interest rates. Since then, debt growth has not altered money growth but may have been associated with interest rate changes. Net federal debt growth, which combines both stwctural and cyclical debt changes, is accompanied by a lower-federal funds rate for the 1971-84 period. This result suggests that cyclical debt changes dominate sti-uctural in NFD's effect on interest rates. In contrast, the high-employment budget deficit, a measure of structural debt changes only, has had no impact on the federal funds rate over any time period. This result may be due to HERD's small size in comparison with total credit demands.
The results presented here ar-c consistent with monetary policy being independent of federal deficits even though money mar-ket variables do apparently respond to those deficits. During the period when the Federal Reserve was targeting interest rates, the assumed policy measure, the federal funds rate, was unaffected by federal deficits. While the money stock does respond to deficits in the early titne period. 1958-70, the money stock was not being used as a policy target in that interval. Conver-sely. in the later-period, 1971-84, the Federal Reserve paid more attention to the money stock and less to interest rates. In that interval, the primary policy variable, the money stock, was again unaffected by federal deficits while those deficits may have had an impact on inter-est i-ales."
